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The Mechs

Operation Timus Preem, August 2008
Sean M. Maloney

T

anks were first used by the
Canadian Army in Afghanistan
in the fall of 2006 during Operation
Medusa. Simplistic criticism
in public venues focused on the
argument that tanks were unsuited
to counterinsurgency operations
because of the amount of damage
to the infrastructure they caused
moving around or through use of the
vehicles’ weapons. Others viewed the
deployment of tanks as a sign that the
coalition was “losing” the war because
the insurgents had “escalated” to
conventional operations and, in
the Maoist schema, victory for the
insurgents had to be near because
they supposedly transitioned from
guerilla to conventional operations.
Deployment of “conventional” forces
like tanks to counter this “transition”
was therefore problematic.
Comments like “The Soviets used
tanks and failed, Canada is now
using tanks, thererfore Canada will
fail” made the rounds. The presence
of Canadian tanks in Afghanistan
assumed political as well as practical
dimensions.
By 2008, these arguments had all
but died away in the mediasphere
and the punditocracy. Tanks were
no longer a novelty in the Canadian
area of operations. The Leopard
C-2s of 2006 were replaced by
Leopard 2A6Ms by the summer of
2007, though many Leo C2s stayed
on to push anti-mine and antiIED implements that could not
be mounted on the new vehicles

O p e r a t i o n T i m u s P r e e m , l e d by
Lieutenant-Colonel David Corbould
and conducted by the 2 Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
(PPCLI) Battlegroup in August 2008 was
a mechanized assault involving nearly
two battalion-sized units of Canadian
and Afghan forces, with armour leading
the main effort. Overall, Operation Timus
Preem was a successful operation.
It forced the enemy to re-organize
their command structure and replace
leaders. It wiped out their “forward” IED
production capacity and transit base to
the Sangeray area and the operation
also most likely took out some of the
people involved in killing the three
Canadian engineers on the eve of the
operation.

because of their armour’s modular
construction.1 What became evident
to Canadian battlegroup commanders
very quickly once they got on the
ground was the diversity of the
terrain in Kandahar province. That
diversity dictated that a variety of
forces be employed to meet coalition
objectives. In this case, tanks would be
unsuited for operations in Kandahar
City, or say, the mountainous Maruf
or upper Shah Wali Kot districts.
In the open terrain in Maywand,
however, there were advantages
to using armour. Tanks could be
used even in the built up green belts
around the city. The Howz-e Madad
incursion of June 2007 2 was one
example. There was also Arghandab
1 in October-November 2007 during
which a troop of Leopard C-2s
covered open high ground to screen
a battalion-sized assault into a built
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up area – right out of Canadian Cold
War FIBUA 3 doctrine. Armoured
columns were used to resupply
isolated strongpoints like Mushan.4
Operation Timus Preem, led by
Lieutenant-Colonel David Corbould
and conducted by the 2 Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
(PPCLI) Battlegroup in August was a
mechanized assault involving nearly
two battalion-sized units of Canadian
and Afghan forces, with armour
leading the main effort. Operation
Timus Preem resembled Operation
Totalize, or Tractable, the Canadian
offensives in Normandy in 1944,on a
smaller scale: the terrain is extremely
restricted and similar to bocage
in Normandy and the operation
involved the use of armoured
breaching columns.5

The Origins of the Operation

T

he 2008 iteration of Joint Task
Force Afghanistan, led by
Brigadier-General Denis Thompson,
planned to create a “stability box” in
eastern Zharey District in Kandahar
province. The idea was to select a key
area and apply serious resources to
it. Operations in the box would, in
theory, dislocate insurgents, convince
the “fence sitters” to support the
government, deny the enemy the
ability to influence the population
in the box, and prepare the area for
a high-profile development projects.
Stability Box Juno was established
in June-July 2008. It encompassed
57
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Above: Brigadier-General Denis Thompson (left) was the commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan. Right: LieutenantColonel David Corbould was the commanding officer of the 2 Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battlegroup.

Route Summit from Highway 1 down
to Bazaar-e Panjwayi in Panjwayi
district. Stability Box Juno was also
supposed to give focus to Canadian
development efforts: CIDA, DFAIT,
and other government departments
now had a specific area in which to
establish a joint interagency team to
work together on a series of projects.
The intention was that a second
stability box would be established
in Panjwayi district once Juno was
up and running. Juno was limited to
part of Zharey district because there
were not enough resources to project
Afghan governance and security
throughout the whole district.
Several factors militated against
the effective operation of Juno. The
primary reason was the Sarposa
prison break and the subsequent
diversion of forces to conduct the
Arghandab 2 operation in June 2008.
The secondary factor was the ongoing
demand for the 2 PPCLI Battlegroup’s
infantry companies to occupy legacy
tactical infrastructure positions along
Route Fosters. As usual, the dearth
of Afghan police and the continuing
build-up of the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and its occasional
diversion to Helmand province
were impediments to establishing
security in the stability box, as were
58
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss3/7

Maloney - The Mechs.indd 58

the ongoing problems between
the Afghans as to who constituted
legitimate governance in the two
districts. The Canadian interagency
piece was still evolving. If Juno was
supposed to be a showcase, there was
not much under the glass by the high
summer of 2008. That did not prevent
continuing efforts to jump start the
process, however, and consequent
enemy disruptive activities.
Indeed, a series of operations
along Highway 1 near Sanjeray
assumed priority status. The enemy
had conducted a series of highprofile IED attacks on the highway
which threatened to cut off this vital
east-west commercial and logistic
route. Operation Asp-e-Janoubi,
(aka “Ass Pain Janoubi” to the staff)
was a complex operation involving
the transport of a huge turbine
from Kandahar Air Field all the
way to the Kajaki Dam in Helmand
province. The Kajaki Dam was the
key hydroelectric producer in the
region and, after years of neglect, it
was failing. The logistics of moving
such a piece of equipment over such
a distance and then protecting it from
enemy action were immense. Keep in
mind that the information operations
effects of failure for Asp-e-Janoubi
were potentially catastrophic and

overshadowed Canadian operations
in Kandahar Province.
Over the course of the summer,
the battlegroup planning staff, led
by Major Jay Adair, developed a
series of plans designed to “protect
and enable” Stability Box Juno.
ISTAR resources were focused on
the area west of Juno, specifically
on a suspected enemy command
node in a large compound complex
dubbed Objective Weasel. This node
had some relationship to the IED
cells operating along Highway 1 but
it also was connected to the rocket
attacks on Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Mas’um Ghar. Another cell
and command and control node from
Nahlgam to the southwest operated
against Afghan National Police in
western Zharey, while another cell
harrassed Strong Point Mushan over
in western Panjwayi district.
Objective Weasel was a physical
location but the pattern of activity
in that area varied. Enemy leaders
came and went, including the
notorious Jabber Agha,6 and there
were an estimated 40 to 50 enemy
fighters in the vicinity. Zangabad
boasted another 40 or 50 fighters, as
did Nahlgam. A number of enemy
IED specialists, based in Sia Choy
and Nahlgam, used Weasel as a
2
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transit point when they moved to
and from Sanjeray. Adair and his
staff discussed the possibility that
Objective Weasel also served as part
of the enemy’s early warning system.
If coalition forces started to move
west from Juno, the forces around
Weasel would conduct some form of
covering force fight until the “deep”
forces in western Zharey could be
mobilized and deployed.
The planners struggled to
identify objectives. There were not
enough Afghan security forces to
establish an enduring presence in the
area cleared by coalition forces, so
extending Stability Box Juno was out.
However, a major operation against
these enemy forward positions could
accomplish multiple objectives. First,
it would probably interfere with
enemy operations in Sanjeray and his
IED operations in Highway1. That
would draw off heat from the turbine
move. Second, 3 Royal Canadian
Regiment (RCR) Battlegroup was
arriving in September to affect a
relief in place (or RIP) with 2 PPCLI
Battlegroup. One lesson from 2006
was that the enemy would use every
means available to exploit the lack
of acclimatization of the incoming
forces. A major operation that put
the enemy back on his heels right
before the RIP would positively
contribute to the process and protect
the incoming forces. Finally, an
operation like this would force the
enemy away from Juno and give the
interagency and governance process
some breathing room.
This was only a contingency
operation as of 8 August and there was
no inevitability about its execution.
Were there enough forces available to
mount it if Task Force Kandahar said
“go”? This was a serious problem. A
combination of the leave plan, the
protection of tactical infrastructure,
a quick reaction force task, and the
siphoning off of infantry platoons
to guard bridges in northeastern
Kandahar province near Zabol
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meant that 2 PPCLI battlegroup
had less than 50 percent of its forces
available for planning purposes. The
planners had four infantry platoons
in LAV‑IIIs; two tank troops; a
Coyote recce troop; two engineer
platoons; and the M-777 artillery
battery available. For command and
control, there were two infantry
company headquarters, a tank
squadron headquarters and the recce
squadron headquarters. This was not
going to be enough. The planners
looked at Afghan National Security
Force availability. After consultation
with the Canadian Operational
Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT),
there was the possibility that an ANA
company and an ANA platoon, with
their Canadian mentors, could be
cut loose for the operation. Perhaps
more. Perhaps not.
Between 8 August and 16 August,
the concept of operations (CONOP)
continued to evolve. In a general
sense, there would be a main effort
in the centre against the western area
of Pashmul, with two supporting
attacks, one to the northwest down
from Highway 1, and the other
moving east to west south of Pashmul.
In the CONOP plan, planners used
phase lines named after characters
from the movie “Transformers,” a
DVD that was popular among the

armoured soldiers. The CONOP was
thus formally designated Operation
Timus Preem. Regional Command
(South), which consisted of older
staff officers not au fait with popular
culture, asked what Timus Preem
was – Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould
told everybody it meant “lawn
mower” in Pashto.
On 16 August, Operation Timus
Preem was formalized by Task
Force Kandahar. Coincidentally,
there was more and more ISTAR
reports of enemy leadership in and
around Objective Weasel, including
Jabber Agha and two other senior
commanders. Structurally, the plan
remained the same: a main effort
directed against three successive
objective areas, with two disrupt
operations in the flanks, and aerial
screens provided by US Army
OH‑58D helicopters and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV). The only
real debate at this point was how
to hit Objective Weasel, with what,
and when. One planner wanted to
use a particular missile system, but
that was not available so the idea
of unloading a B-1B bomber onto
Weasel at the start of the operation
emerged. Weasel’s elimination at
the start of the operation would, in
theory, have a significant disruptive
effect.

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2010
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FOB Mas’um Ghar:
“B” Squadron, Lord
Strathcona’s Horse

C

CFJIC IS2008-9163

anadian operations in eastern
Zharey district had evolved
significantly over the course of three
years. During the summer operations
in 2006, Task Force Orion relied on
deception, night operations, and
stealth to infiltrate the Pashmul
area with LAV-III-mounted
infantry. The mass deployment of
improvised explosive devices altered
that approach and in 2007 2 RCR
Battlegroup conducted daytime
tank-led mechanized incursions
into the district coupled with early
morning dismounted infantry
insertions. In 2008, 2 PPCLI mounted

several company-sized dismounted
incursions supported by tanks.
Operation Timus Preem would be the
first battlegroup-sized operation of
the 2008 rotation where the tanks led.
The three designated objective
areas in Operation Timus Preem
require some explanation. Each
objective area was a collection of
compound complexes, almost like
islands. Each cluster of complexes
was surrounded by grape growing
trenches, drying huts, tree-covered
irrigation systems, and because it was
August, lush and dense vegetation
(corn and marijuana, mostly). The
only roads into and out of these areas
were one-lane unpaved routes with
multiple irregular twists and turns
and innumerable culverts. That is,

theses routes were perfect for IED
emplacement.
The only way to avoid IED
attack and subsequent canalization
and delay was, in effect, to create
unpredictably new roads as the
operation progressed. This is where
the armoured vehicles came in.
The Badger Armoured Engineer
Vehicle or AEV employed at this
time was a Leopard 1 hull with
engineering modifications, including
a durable dozer blade. The armoured
engineers were also experimenting
with fascines carried not only on
the AEV but by armoured trucks,
the Mercedes AHSVS, as the Beaver
AVLB vehicle was too unwieldy to
use in the Zharey environment. The
AEV boom or any vehicle crane could
lift facines off of the truck’s cargo area
and emplace it. Then there were the
older Leopard C-1s equipped with
dozer blades.
“B” Squadron, led by Major
Chris Adams and Squadron Sergeant
Major Tony Batty, experimented with
these and other measures throughout
their tour. They built on tactical
ideas that their predecessors used in
previous rotations, particularly the
employment (and recovery) of tanks
in mobility restricted environments.
The vehicles themselves were finetuned as much as possible by Tango
Maintenance at FOB Mas’um Ghar.
“B” Squadron’s proficiency level
was at its peak in August 2008 and it
would all contribute to the success of
Operation Timus Preem.
In terms of structure, “B”
Squadron had three troops, each
consisting of a mix of vehicles. As

Photo by author

Photo by author

Badger Armoured Engineering Vehicles
carried improvised fascines that were
deployed via the bucket boom during
the operation.

A Canadian Forces Leopard 1C2 Main
Battle Tank (left) sits side-by-side
with its newly-acquired cousin, the
Leopard 2A6M.
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a rule, there were four Leopard 2
A6Ms, plus one or two Leopard
C-2s equipped with either anti-mine
plows, rollers, or dozer blades in
each troop. The make up of each
troop depended on the mission type
– River Run, incursion, or Quick
Reaction Force. There was also a
mechanized infantry platoon on
rotation from one of the 2 PPCLI
companies, an artillery FOO and
his LAV-III, a troop of armoured
combat engineers with AEVs, an
Explosive Ordinance Disposal team,
plus armoured recovery vehicle
assets and armoured ambulances.
The Leopard 2 A6Ms with their
120 mm smoothbore guns were
capable of firing canister or HEAT
rounds. The “M” on the designation
stood for “mine resistant” as the
Canadian vehicles had a variety of
modifications designed to mitigate
the effects of IED and mine strikes.
At the same time “B” Squadron
was responsible for supporting
development efforts in the Panjwayi
and Zharey districts. This took many
forms but usually meant attempts
to coordinate efforts between the
Canadian government departments,
the Provincial Reconstruction Team,
the Operational Mentor and Liaison

team, the Police OMLT, and the
Afghan security and governance
people. “B” Squadron staff referred
to themselves as the “Panjwayi
East Combined Operations Centre”
or the home of the “Whole of
Panjwayi Programme for Enhanced
Reconstruction.” “B” Squadron also
handled FOB MSG security, which
included counter-rocket operations.
Leopard 2s emplaced in overwatch
positions regularly engaged Taliban
rocket teams at night in Operations
Box Elton as they prepared to fire at
the FOB.7
FOB MSG was also home to the
Operational Mentor and Liaison
Team supporting 1st Kandak, 1/205
Brigade of the Afghan National
Army. Led by Major Dave Proctor,
the OMLT had its headquarters
and support facilities co-located
but not under the command of “B”
Squadron. There was also a Combat
Service Support detachment led by
Lieutenant Alison Lucas. The CSS
detachment forward, consisting
of vehicle techs, electro-optical
equipment techs, weapons techs,
and supply techs were responsible
for non-tank maintenance and
supply distribution at the FOB.
The detachment had tracked light

armoured vehicle (TLAV) personnel
carriers, an armoured heavy support
vehicle wrecker (AHSVS), a heavy
logistics vehicle wheeled (HLVW)
with a crane, and heavy equipment
(i.e., vehicle) transporters (HET).
Importantly in this environment,
the detachment had the ability to
deploy a fire control system repair
team, under armour, into the field.
Tango Maintenance was a separate
organization and included the
Leopard 1 and -2 Armoured Recovery
Vehicles.

The Enemy Draws First Blood

A

t 0730 hours on 19 August the
shock wave from an explosion
rocked FOB MSG. The FOB’s
occupants initially thought a rocket
had hit the camp, but in time the
crews from the Quick Reaction
Force, consisting of Leopard 1 and
Leopard 2s, plus an ARV and Bison
ambulance, moved quickly to their
vehicles and started up. The Tactical
Operations Centre staff was trying to
ascertain what happened. It turned
out that an enemy suicide bomber
attacked a Canadian-mentored
Afghan national police patrol on the
Bazaar-e Panjwayi-Kandahar City

An example of the complex terrain encountered in Zharey
District during Op Timus Preem. This is a collection of grape
drying huts surrounded by vineyard trenches that are four to
five feet deep and choked with vegetation.
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however, was not high and there
was some internal debate between
the Zahrey-based commanders as
to the future direction of operations.
In terms of leadership, Jabber Agha
was estimated to be around Pashmul
planning more suicide bomber
and IED attacks, while Khaliq and
Razaq, two of the Zharey district
commanders, had been seen near
Objective Weasel.
Once Operation Timus Preem
was detected, the staff anticipated
that the enemy would use his early
warning system to determine what
axis of advance the coalition forces
were using, and then lay multiple
IEDs to delay the Canadians and
Afghans while reinforcements were
brought in from the west, married
up with their weapons caches, and
then deployed to fighting positions.
The dissenting opinion was that the
enemy would drop their weapons
and walk away to the west and not
engage. Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould
believed that in either case there
would be a significant disruptive
effect on enemy operations in eastern
Zharey and this would meet the
operation’s objectives.
The main effort, consisting of “B”
Squadron and “C” Company, was to
conduct a rapid breach and isolate
each objective area with a “ring of
steel.” The tanks and infantry were
divided up into Breach Teams, BT-1
and BT-2:
BT-1:
“B” Squadron HQ (2 X Leopard 2)
“C” Company HQ (1 X LAV-III)

SLAYER (2 X LAV-III with
forward observation officer

Photo by author

road. One interpreter was killed and
a Canadian Police-OMLT mentor
wounded. A local national child
was also wounded and a medical
evacuation chopper was called in.
This did not stop planning for
Operation Timus Preem. Captain
Edgetar Manoucheri, the battle
captain and the “B” Squadron staff
fine-tuned their part of the plan. A
confirmatory drill held later that day
revealed that “C” Company, 2 PPCLI,
plus “B” Squadron would handle
the main effort. The northwestern
supporting effort would be done by
the OMLT with two ANA companies,
while “B” Company and an ANA
company would handle the southern
supporting effort. Knowing full well
that the enemy kept close observation
on FOB MSG, Major Adams prepositioned his vehicles inside the FOB
as he normally would for a River Run
down to Strong Point Mushan so that
the enemy would think the upcoming
operations was directed west, not
north. Hopefully the enemy would
also re-position his forces which in
turn would be detected by ISTAR
resources – and then other coalition
resources could be directed from
higher headquarters to interfere with
the enemy’s activities.
Enemy forces in and around
the objective areas were estimated
to be around 325 fighters, of which
100 were assessed to be skilled.
They knew how to exploit cover
to protect themselves from ISTAR
assets and were well versed in how
to exploit the limitations on the
Canadian forces imposed by NATO
rules of engagement. Enemy morale,

(FOO)/forward air controller
(FAC)/JTAC)
1 Troop (4 X Leopard 2, 2 X
Leopard 1)
Badger Armoured Engineer
Vehicle
Leopard 2 Armoured Recovery
Vehicle
Fuel truck (AHVSS)
Ammo truck (AHVSS)
Fascine truck (AHVSS)
1 X infantry platoon in LAV-III
BT-2:
3 Troop (4 X Leopard 2, 2 X
Leopard 1)
Badger Armoured Engineer
Vehicle
Leopard 2 Armoured Recovery
Vehicle
1 X Leo 2 detached from “B”
Squadron HQ for command and
control
1 X infantry platoon in LAV-III
Four M-777 155mm guns and eight
81 mm mortars on call.

The ANA, the OMLT mentors,
and ANP with Canadian Engineer
Exploitation Teams would then
sweep the compounds and exploit
any material or personnel found.
The force would then move to the
next objective and do the same
thing. Any defensive works would
be destroyed through demolition.
Aerial overwatch would observe any
“squirters” and track them. There
were three objective areas for the
operation, which was estimated to

A Leopard 2 A6M advances through a field on day one of Op Timus Preem. The
decision to avoid existing roads by the advancing forces resulted in no IED
strikes during the operation.
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Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
advance along a track during OP Timis
Preem.

inside. Then the vehicle started to
burn. An armoured recovery vehicle
and a Bison ambulance approached
the site to right the wreck and extract
the crew, but there was no protected
fire-fighting capability to stop the fire.
Then ISTAR reports noted that six
to ten insurgents with a significant
enemy leader were nearing the blast
site. Medical evacuation helicopters
were called in, but there were now
concerns that the enemy might
have laid IEDs on the nearest open
space – the American task force
wanted engineers to clear a helicopter
landing site before they would go in.

There were an estimated four
casualties, but their status was in
some doubt. One Canadian was
outside of the vehicle but three were
still inside. Then ammunition in the
stricken LAV started to cook off,
which slowed the recovery team’s
efforts. Back in the battlegroup
tactical operations centre, the JTAC
and intelligence staff were trying to
track the inbound enemy commander
with the intent of using a MQ-1
Predator or MQ-9 Reaper to kill
him. Artillery could not be used
because of a rules of engagement
issue. Fortunately for him, when the

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2010

take three days. Of note, Operation
Timus Preem would also have
psychological operations (PSYOPS)
and civil-military cooperation
(CIMIC) detachments in support of
the effort.
While preparations for Operation
Timus Preem continued, the Red
Phone in the “B” Squadron tactical
operations centre rang to the theme
from the movie “In Like Flint.”
A massive explosion occurred on
Highway 1 around 1040 hours on 20
August. A Canadian engineer recce
party supporting Operation Aspy
Janoubi consisting of an engineer
section and recce platoon from 2
PPCLI were subjected to IED attack.
As the quick reaction force rolled out
the gate, ISTAR reports warned that
an enemy commander in western
Zahrey was preparing to send forces
to attack those responding to assist.
The drama continued all
morning. The stricken vehicle had
flipped over, the turret wrenched off
and the surviving crew was trapped

CFJIC AR2008-K073-98
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Operation Timus Preem was initiated by nine bombs dropped by a B-1B
on Objective Weasel, an enemy command and control compound.

64
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Day 1 – 21 August

point, M-777 guns were called in to
suppress the weapon.
Tragically, the quick reaction
force reported in that there were three
Canadian dead and one wounded.8
The belief at FOB Mas’um Ghar
was that Commander Canadian
Expeditionary Force Command,
who was in theatre at this time,
might put a hold on Operation
Timus Preem, anticipating domestic
political sensitivities. This proved
to be unfounded, however, and the
enraged Canadians made their final
preparations late into the night of 20
August. The crew of T-23, a Leopard
C-2, spray-painted the visage of a
grim reaper and his scythe onto the
dozer blade of their vehicle.

A

Photo by author

UAVs became available he could not
be engaged because of another rules
of engagement issue.
The staff discovered that there
was in fact a firefighter vehicle
available but they had not been
told it existed – it was to suppress
aircraft fires at the landing zone and
“belonged” to another organization
at Kandahar Air Field. Major Steve
Davies from the OMLT volunteered
to lead this virtually unarmoured
recovery “package” through Zharey
district to the strike site. This included
the firefighting vehicle, a dump
truck (to fill in the crater) and a lowbed heavy equipment transporter,
escorted by OMLT RG-31 patrol
vehicles. Another threat warning
from ISTAR reports came in – the
enemy was deploying a mortar team
to attack the IED strike site. Resources
were deployed to look for it. The
flat screen television in the tactical
operations centre, set to a news
channel, surreally announced that
Christina Applegate was diagnosed
with breast cancer. It was quickly
shut off. The mortar team, it turned
out, directed its efforts at Strong Point
Mushan, not the strike site. After two
mortar rounds landed near the strong

t 0415 the battlegroup’s TAC
forward at FOB MSG was fully
manned and at 0426 hours, a pair of
US Army AH-64 Apaches arrived
on station and checked in. Inside
FOB MSG, long lines of armoured
vehicles from the breach teams with
their engines off sat in the dark,
their crews cupping their cigarettes.
Foot patrols swept suspected rocket
launch locations sites outside the
camp. Operation Timus Preem was
cocked and ready, awaiting clearence
to engage Objective Weasel. ISTAR
assets were now closely observing
the site, checking the pattern of life.
When a control link failed between
an allied ground station and an
allied UAV that was operating on
the flanks, a Canadian Sperwer was
brought on station to check a “deep”
target in western Zharey district.
Nothing. No movement. ISTAR
reports – enemy quiet.
The breach team columns roared
to life at 0445 hours and headed out
the gate, down the road and into
the Arghandab River wadi. Instead
of turning left and heading down
the river to Mushan, the Badgers,
8
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Leopards, and LAVs proceded north
on Route Summit. No contact. The sun
was just starting to come up at 0515
hours revealing dusty mountains in
the distance. ISTAR resources still
had observation on Objective Weasel,
waiting for the enemy commanders
to arrive. Breach Team 1 reported in
– the first breach is in. Unfortunately
a traffic jam developed on Route
Summit which slowed down the
second breach team’s movements.
The ANA and the OMLT moved on to
their objectives south of the breaches.
At this point the enemy’s
early warning network was not
reporting anything using any means,
nor was the enemy activating
reinforcements. Lieutenant-Colonel
Corbould believed that the presence
of the AH‑64s was deterring enemy
movement, so he ordered them to
orbit elsewhere for the time being,
hoping the enemy would come out
and play. By 0605 hours, there was
still no detected enemy movement.
The Badgers, with their blades
down, turned west off of Route
Summit ploughing tracks across
the grape trenches and smashing
through high mud walls. Then a
Leo 1 with a dozer blade followed
behind, ploughing four or five small
paths off the main track. The Leo 1
dozer then backed up and the paths
were occupied by the Leopard 2s.
This “herring bone” formation was
repeated as necessary, with the
infantry following in LAV-IIIs.
The tracks allowed the columns to
completely bypass the roads which
were assumed to have pre-positioned
IEDs on them.
At 0634 hours, the enemy
finally reacted and their whole
communications system erupted in
an aural blur. Lieutenant-Colonel
Corbould could not wait any longer
and decided to engage Objective
Weasel. The battlegroup tactical
headquarters chatted with a B-1B
that was orbiting high overhead.
The staff filed out of the bunker
with their binoculars to watch.
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A cloud of smoke and dust billows from the target of a Canadian M-777 155 mm gun
which fired a mission to discourage enemy withdrawal from an objective compound.
LAV-III and RG-31 with mounted infantry advance along a lane plowed through the
grape fields.
A dozer-equipped Leopard 1 moves up to plow run-ups for the LAV-IIIs. The lack of
air conditioning in the older vehicles resulted in the manufacture of heat reflective
umbrellas which significantly reduced temperatures for the crews.
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Top: Pre-positioned chambers for improvised explosive devices were discovered
along the roads. Combat engineers cleared the roads behind the advance forces
to permit resupply.
Middle: Soldiers from the Afghan National Army and their Canadian Army operational
mentors advance to search a compound complex. The ANA were responsible for all
compound searches, while the Canadians handled cut-off security.

It was now a dusty, hot dawn.
Objective Weasel was barely
perceptible from FOB MSG. A loud
“CRUUUMMMMPPPP!”, the shock
wave of nine guided bomb units
smashing into Weasel, hit the FOB
and a plume of black smoke could be
seen several kilometers away.
“B” Squadron got the first contact
at 0637 hours. A volly of rocketpropelled grenade and small arms
fire was directed at the lead vehicles.
Leopards from 2 Troop returned
fire. Then a US police mentoring
team triggered some form of antipersonnel device as the vehicle
manoeuvred, wounding one of its
crew. By 0654 hours there were
several contacts underway – the
OMLT and their Afghan troops were
engaged in two locations on the two
supporting efforts; “B” Squadron
was shooting it out with insurgents
on their axis of advance, and “C”
Company, moving in behind “B”
Squadron, was engaging enemy in
a compound. ISTAR detected four,
maybe more, enemy moving to a
compound to engage “C” Company,
but the FOO called in a fire mission
and 155 mm rounds crashed onto the
compound they occupied. A second
fire misson was called in to take out a
similar attempt by the enemy to move
up and engage.
The first objective was designated
Mike. It consisted of numerous
compound complexes and was
separated into Mike 1 through Mike 3.
Breach Team 1 ploughed its way to
Mike, and then ploughed a “ring
road” around Mike. The dozer tanks
then ploughed run ups and paths off
of the “ring road.” Leopard 2s and
LAV-IIIs then moved in. The idea was
to isolate Mike by having 360 degree
observation and fire around the whole
area – anything trying to get into
Mike would be engaged, as would
anything trying to get out. Once the
360 degree cut off was established,
the Afghans, their OMLT mentors,
plus the Engineer Exploitation Team

Bottom: A Leopard 2 in a cut-off position.
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moved in to sweep the Mike 1, 2, and
3 compound complexes. PSYOPS and
CIMIC teams assisted as required if
there were civilians in the area.
Searching one compound
complex, let alone three, was arduous.
Wearing body armour and carrying
ammunition and water in the nearly
45 degree heat was taxing for all
involved. Indeed, it took all day to
sweep and clear Mike.
ISTAR detected enemy movement
near Kilo as the second wave of ANA
deployed. Over in Panjwayi, two
IEDs exploded on Route Fosters,
but apparently not against coalition
targets. As they had in the past,
the enemy was trying to distract
attention from the main effort over
in Zharey.
Around 0800 hours, an OMLT
vehicle observed and engaged enemy
moving around Objective Echo.
The two AH-64s were called in and
unleashed their rocket pods on them.
Another unit, 3 Platoon, identified
enemy movement south of Mike
and started to engage. The JTAC
accompanying Breach Team 1 cleared
in a Harrier which dropped a guided
bomb unit, obliterating the enemy in
the open. The ANA and the OMLT
worked quickly in the Kilo complexes
– they declared the first three clear by
0950 hours.
In an effort to speed up the
opening of resupply and casualty
extraction routes, combat engineers
using counter-IED equipment cleared
the roads parallel to the breaches.
They found numerous pre-positioned
IED components, including a massive
culvert bomb. They also discovered
multiple fighting positions with
interlocking field of fire. These were
destroyed with explosives. In a
disturbing development, an OH-58D
from the Banshees saw a suspected
IED from the air on Route Summit.
Engineers were diverted to examine
the site and remove the device. Then
a vehicle from the American Police
Mentoring Team accompanying
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the Afghan police in Objective Kilo
struck an IED. It was a mobility kill
with no casualties.
The Afghans and the OMLT
continued to get contact, particularly
in and around Objective Kilo to
the west. An ANA platoon had a
short but sharp engagement with
a small group of insurgents who
appeared to be trying to infiltrate
into Objective Mike. Another small
group was driven off by the cut-off
force surrounding Mike. Even the
battlegroup tactical air controller
got involved at 1115 hours, a 9’r
TAC LAV-III observed and engaged
six enemy fighters with rocketpropelled grenade launchers trying
to skirt Mike to the south and get
in behind the cut-off force from the
east. Heavy-calibre weapons were
fired from the RG-31s and LAV-IIIs,
and an AH-64 came in to finish off
what was left with 25 mm cannon
fire. The backpacks these insurgents
were carrying went up in a series of
secondary explosions. The AH-64s
were then diverted to drop a Hellfire
on a grape hut into which several
insurgents were seen to flee. Another
estimated four insurgents were taken
out in that strike. By 1155 hours,
Breach Team 1 remained in position
around Objective Mike, while Breach
Team 2 passed through Mike heading
south.
Normally, the enemy
commanders in Zharey would
be assembling and deploying
reinforcements from communities
in the west. This was not happening
to the extent that some hoped. Was
the enemy discombobulated by the
novelty of the operation? Or was the
enemy choosing not to react and then
flow back in later? Were there other
reasons? Was this slow response an
effect of the strike on Weasel? It was
not clear. What was clear was that
ISTAR reports indicated the enemy
commanders were having problems
activating a single suicide bomber
to infiltrate Mike, let alone mount

a coordinated assault on the Timus
Preem forces.
By 1215 hours, the ANA and
OMLT were consolidating Objective
Kilo, and then found two IEDs.
Objective Mike was being swept, but
was not yet clear. The initial battle
damage assessment of Objective
Weasel was that 90 percent of the
target was damaged. ISTAR reports
suggested but did not confirm that
there were 40 enemy killed in the
strike, including some medium-value
leadership targets.
Breach Team 2 moved south of
Mike and started clearing leaguer
areas for the assault force in the fields.
The Badgers and dozers cleared three
parallel lanes for each assault force.
While this was happening, 4 Platoon
got a contact inside Mike: three
insurgents were positively identified
and engaged in the late afternoon.
Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould’s
assessment of the situation in the
waning hours of 21 August was
that the breaching operations were
much slower than anticipated, the
operations on Objective Kilo were
a successful block with positive
effects, and the deep strikes were
successful at engaging reinforcing
fighters. He now had a decision:
should the force go after Objective
Golf or Objective Whiskey? It was
unfortunate that the coalition did
not have the resources permanently
to garrison Objectives Mike, Golf,
and Whiskey. The battlegroup had
temporarily expanded the “security
bubble” west of Stability Box Juno. It
was too bad that this situation could
not be exploited.
The CIMIC teams were now
reporting that there were some
annoyed farmers. It could take
years, even decades in some cases,
to grow the huge grape vines in these
trenches. Chunks of these fields were
being obliterated by the dozer blades.
The message from the battlegroup
was less than conciliatory: “If you
told us where the IEDs were on the
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right to engage. It may have been a
funeral.
It was a cool night as the crews
bedded down behind their vehicles.
Captain Tom Neil and his PSYOPS
crews in their RG-31s turned on their
loudspeakers. Interpreters read out
messages and letters to the Taliban
in Pashto, trying to convince them
to quit the fighting: “Taliban, if you
want to use the children for suicide
attacks that is not good. They are
innocents. If you are ready to fight
grown-ups, we are here.” “Taliban,
if you drank your mother’s milk,
then come out to the fighting place
and fight us. If you don’t, then you
are a bastard.” A Scan Eagle MUAV
buzzed the leaguer, and orbited the
perimeter.

Day 2 – 22 August

T

he troops put away their
sleeping gear after they awoke
in the morning cool. LieutenantColonel Corbould decided to move
on objectives Whiskey and Golf
simultaneously. His decision was
in part based on overnight ISTAR
reports. The enemy, apparently,
believed that this incursion was
payback for the three Canadians
killed on Highway 1. They also
were surprised that the force did
not pull out at noon and remained
in the field. They were confused as
to what the next move was going

to be. They knew the force was
aligned south in its leaguers – but
that could mean it was headed to
the compound complexes in Golf
or Whiskey. Therefore, LieutenantColonel Corbould concluded, hit
both objectives. Breach Team 1 would
move on Golf, while Breach Team
2 would move on Whiskey. Then,
depending on how things went, the
forces would proceed onto Bravo.
Again it took the enemy several
hours to make any moves. ISTAR
reports had an 82 mm mortar
preparing to fire at coalition forces,
while over in Objective Bravo 14
insurgents with what looked like a
heavy weapon were seen moving
around but could not be engaged.
There was no movement around Kilo.
There was now talk that JTF-A
or Canadian Expeditionary Force
Command might order Operation
Timus Preem terminated so that the
engineers from 1 Combat Engineer
Regiment that were in the field on
the operation could go to Kandahar
Air Field to participate in the ramp
ceremony for their three dead
comrades. There was additional talk
that this was related to increased
political pressure to avoid more
casualties and that was also an
argument to finish the operation early.
The idea that the combat engineers
could extract seperately from the
operation was also floated and
rejected. Ultimately, the operation
Photo by author

roads, we wouldn’t have to make our
own,” they were told. That is, you
locals are “fence sitting.” You want
us to stop, come off the fence.
At 1830 hours, 120 mm and
25 mm fire erupted west of Mike,
and artillery started to land on
targets. There were contacts all over
the place and it appeared as though
small groups were trying to infiltrate
at dusk. They were unsuccessful. By
1845 hours, both breach teams were
lined up in their lanes south of Mike
when cries of “Stand To!” were called
out. The lead tanks on the lanes then
engaged targets 300 to 400 metres to
the south in the direction of Objective
Golf. Three groups of fighting age
males pretending to be labourers
during the day recovered cached
weapons at night and advanced on
the leaguer. They were all taken out.
ISTAR resources reported that
the enemy was bringing in an “82” in
a vehicle. Was it a mortar or a recoilless rifle? Nobody was sure. “Crash
harbour” was not an option given
the restrictive terrain. Four civilian
vehicles and some 20 personnel were
spotted moving in from the south
west, but weapons were not evident.
Various systems continued to track
them. Then coalition forces over in
Objective Kilo started tracking night
movements, up to 50 personnel.
ISTAR picked up that a significant
enemy commander from Zharey was
present, but the conditions were not

RG-31’s, LAV-III’s, a Bison, and a fascine
carrier establish themselves in the centre
of a night leaguer.
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continued at the behest of BrigadierGeneral Dennis Thompson, who
rejected the notion that Operation
Timus Preem should be prematurely
ended.
Breach Team 2 had eyeson Objective Whiskey-2, where
Objective Weasel was located. There
was no pattern of life. The breach was
launched. To get at Weasel, the breach
team had to traverse complex terrain.
The Badger AEV went first. Its blade,
ploughed through a marijuana field,
took down a hardened five-foot high
mud wall, and cut a path through a
square corn field, then took down
the next wall, which was nearly eight
feet high. This put the AEV into a
second square walled field, where
the process was repeated. When
the last wall was down, the AEV
was in sight of Objective Whiskey.
This route was selected because the
ground was relatively flat. The walled
fields to the east were full of grape
growing trenches, and the west there
was a wooded stream with a wall
paralleling it.
The Leopard 2 troop followed
the AEV, burst out of the last breach,
and moved in open ground to isolate
Objective Whiskey. The Leopard
C-2 with the dozer followed and
ploughed out the “herring bone”
run-ups in the first field, which was
occupied by the battalion tactical air
controller.The tank then moved to the
second field and did the same for the
infantry LAV-IIIs
By 0837 hours, Objective Whiskey
was isolated by the cut-off forces
and the exploitation started. Major
Dave Proctor’s OMLT, with Warrant
Officer Chuck Côte accompanying
the lead Afghan infantry company,
dismounted, marched through the
breaches, deployed, and prepared to
move on Whiskey. A pair of AH‑64s
orbited the proceedings, looking
for targets. In the initial search the
Afghans and the OMLT found a large
mortar cache and a pile of artillery
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rounds that were probably destined
to become IEDs. A small bunker
was found adjacent to the strike
site and the exploitation continued.
A report came in that the stench of
rotting flesh was noticeable around
the Objective Weasel strike site.
Further explorations uncovered large
amounts of material to make IEDs.
Another interesting discovery made
by the engineers was that the enemy
was re-using Canadian construction
materials that had been used to build
Afghan National Police Sub Stations
in Zharey district to shore up their
bunkers and fighting positions.
Objective Kilo then started to
take mortar fire; four rounds landed
near the OMLT and ANA leaguer.
These rounds bracketed the force,
and indicated that an experienced
or at least trained enemy mortarman
was in play. The ANA and the OMLT
engaged enemy spotters, while a
quick analysis determined the firing
point for the mortar base plate. A
distant explosion signalled the abrupt
end of enemy mortar team; it was
engaged with a guided bomb unit
from a Harrier, killing the whole
team. ISTAR reports indicated that
the enemy commanders kept trying
to contact the team throughout the
afternoon, to no avail.
Breach Team 1 followed Breach
Team 2 through its breach, and then
turned west south of Objective Golf.
The Badgers and Leopard 2s swung
north to isolate Golf from the west,
while keeping an eye on Bravo to
the south. The shortage of Afghans
meant that the Canadian infantry
platoon with Breach Team 1 and the
Engineer Exploitation Team had their
hands full with Golf.
Echelon elements carrying
fuel, ammunition, water and food
followed the Breach Team 2 Badger,
which scraped out leaguer rows in a
large open field south of Objective
Weasel. The battalion TAC and the
echelon moved into these positions.

Around 1625 hours, the enemy was
able to get off a round or two of either
mortar or rocket-propelled grenade
airburst which exploded near the
battalion TAC just as the Leopard 2
Armoured Recovery Vehicle nicknamed “Calgary” hooked up a
Leopard 2 that was having power
pack problems. The turret crews
could see spotting pop ups along
walls, but they could not tell if they
were enemy spotters or curious
children, or both. Then an orbiting
MQ-1 spotted a pair of men with
binoculars observing the leaguers
and started to track them.
Major Chris Adams observed six
insurgents in a nearby compound,
while the JTAC spotted two more
carrying what looked like a heavy
weapon, possibly an 82 mm recoilless rifle. The orbiting Predator was
cleared to engage. At the same time,
the Afghans engaged a target with
small arms fire, and then a Leopard 2
fired a 120 mm cannister round at
a group of insurgents who were
probing the leaguer positions.
Almost all Canadian groups in all
of the objective areas reported people
equipped with binoculars observing
the new positions. Orders were given
to engage anyone involved in this
activity. An unknown vehicle crew
commander whispered onto the
net: “I seeeee you!” right before his
gunner fired. A total of three enemy
spotter teams were taken out using
25 mm and 120 mm fire.
Objective Whiskey was now 100
percent clear. Additional searches
uncovered mortar, rocket-propelled
grenade and IED material caches (the
mortar rounds had Chinese markings
on them). A number of radios were
found, plus some cell phones and
a significant quantity of medical
supplies. A detainee was taken and
whisked away to Kandahar Air Filed
via UH-60 helicopter. Objective Golf,
however, was not cleared yet, so there
was no update on material found. At
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At dusk a Leopard 2 tracks suspected spotters from the night leaguer. After the sun
went down, this vehicle engaged and destroyed an enemy anti-tank team.

1645 hours, the enemy ineffectively
engaged the leaguer with rocketpropelled grenade and small arms
fire from the west.
Information from Afghan sources
indicated that the enemy had moved
back in on the initial breach routes
from Summit to Objective Mike
and laid eight IEDs on them. They
also determined that 15 wounded
enemy fighters were evacuated to one
field hospital, and eight to another.
For the most part, the bulk of the
insurgents in the objectives areas
retreated west, south west, and south
to get out of the way of the armoured
onslaught. The results of the airstrike
on Objective Weasel were in some
dispute. The numbers of enemy
killed were revised down. The best
estimate at this point was 25 killed, 15
wounded, including a small number
of Arabs, Pakistanis, and possibly
Chechyns. Further information came
in that the enemy had 15 fighters
placing mines on routes south of
the leaguer, trying to anticipate the
force’s movement. Again, reports of
more inbound mortar teams came in.
The Badger AEVs were tasked to dig
shell scrapes throughout the leaguer.
The engineers used plastic explosives
to take down large Ironwood trees
that blocked the tanks’ arcs of fire.
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Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould
assessed the situation. The enemy
was reacting in a more coordinated
fashion than the day before, but
still not strongly. The options were
to move onto Bravo, continue to
“muck out” Golf, both, or withdraw.
Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould was
also prepared to use the leaguer as a
“hedgehog” and rack up the kills – if
the enemy chose to take it on. The
enemy, on the other hand, seemed
to be slowly reinforcing the area near
Objective Bravo with small groups.
Small groups of young men on
motorcycles were also seen entering
the now-abandoned Objective Mike;
there was word that the two enemy
commanders for western Zharey
were on the scene.
Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould
decided to clear Objective Bravo. The
night leaguer was oriented south,
while Objective Bravo was to the
west. It was probable that the enemy
would think the axis of advance
would be south and not west, so
some surprise might be achieved.
The move on Bravo would also
avoid the mines the enemy placed
to the south. Both breach teams
would isolate the rather elongated
Bravo objective area, then the ANA
and OMLT would clear south to

north to throw off anybody still in
their positions. The only issue was a
pair of small wadis, but the fascines
would be put to good use there. The
Canadian and Afghan forces pulled
into their night leaguers, dismounted
and made supper. As the night
closed in the PSYOPS teams played
Blue Oyster Cult’s “Don’t Fear the
Reaper,” followed by a succession of
distorted tunes from Blink-182, Limp
Bizkit, and Linkin Park. There was no
contact that night.

Day 3 – 23 August

A

t 0630 hours, observers saw a
group of women and children
leaving Objective Bravo and heading
north. An enemy observer with a
cell phone was seen in the midst
of the women and children, so the
Leopard 2 tank crew that was tracking
him refrained from firing its 120 mm
gun. Another group of insurgents
were, however, seen to be signalling
their compatriots, and they had no
human shield, so a 120 mm HEAT
round took them out.
At 0655 hours the Badger AEVs
with their fascines moved out of the
leaguer, heading west southwest.
The two wadis were filled in with
the fascines and crossing points
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established for the follow-on forces.
A motorcycle was seen to leave
Bravo heading west at high speed.
This was probably a “Paul Revere,”
a backup early warning fighter
headed off to alert his commanders
that the coalition forces were not
moving as anticipated. Indeed, crew
commanders and gunners started
to see signalling mirrors blinking
in the morning light. LieutenantColonel Corbould was informed
through ISTAR reports that the
enemy was having serious problems
communicating with their early
warning networks, particularly after
they had been targeted.
Breach Teams 1 and 2 ploughed
on through the rich soil of the tall
cornfields. The Badgers put in the
“ring road” and by 0725 hours the
Leopard 2s and LAV-IIIs had isolated
Objective Bravo. The Afghans and the
OMLT commenced their sweep in the
south. Many fighting age males were
seen but it was difficult to determine
whether they were “moving with
intent” or if they were conducting
“agriculturally-related activities.”
A CIMIC team working with the
Afghan soldiers conducted a Key
Leadership Engagement in one of
the Bravo compounds, as engineers
found a locked trap door elsewhere.
The local nationals told the Afghan
soldiers that the insurgents rounded
up everybody in the area and put
them under guard in a grape hut, and
told them not to leave or look out.
The enemy did not want them telling
coalition forces what direction they
went in. The engineers then found
IED equipment, while an orbiting
UAV saw a man on a motorcycle
headed west stopping and talking to
small groups of fighting age males
that were conducing “agriculturallyrelated activities.” Nobody seemed
to be in a hurry to go anywhere near
Bravo.
The local population in Bravo, it
turned out, was extremely friendly.
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Almost 60 people remained in their
compounds when the sweep forces
came through and they were quite
helpful in describing enemy activity in
their area. The people were adamant
that most of the enemy they saw
were Pakistanis from Balochistan,
with some Arabs and, apparently,
Chechyns. They forced local people
to store vehicles, but did not force
them to store weapons. For the most
part, the insurgents stayed overnight
in the fields, not in the compounds.
They operated in groups no larger
than eight, and usually carried a mix
of small arms and rocket-propelled
grenade launchers. Special two- and
four-man teams carried the 82 mm
recoilless rifles. Local nationals with
military background told the ANA
soldiers that the Taliban were low
on ammunition this season and were
probably incapable of sustained
actions as they had been in 2006.
The CIMIC team decided to hold
a formal shura. In that meeting they
learned that the people in Bravo were
mostly pro-government, so much so
that the Taliban hung a kidnapped
police officer from a tree earlier in
the year to intimidate the people.
More importantly, a local national
with military experience confirmed
that Objective Weasel was in fact
some form of forward headquarters
and depot. The enemy commanders
apparently had two command
“nodes” and rotated them through
Weasel so both would not be killed at
once – Bravo was a transit area for the
backup command node. The enemy
kept a small command team active in
Weasel at all times and augmented
when necessary from Bravo. If an
operation was undertaken east in
Sanjeray, the teams generally passed
through Weasel on the way.
The insurgents interfered with
education in the Bravo area. There
was a school and a principal and the
ANP had a checkpoint to protect it.
The Taliban kidnapped and killed the

police and threatened the principal.
He was forced to hide the small
school library to prevent it from
being burned. The PSYOPS team
was concerned that the enemy would
portray the withdrawal as a victory
to the population. Discussions with
local people confirmed that they
understood that the coalition forces
could not stay indefinitely and would
be resistant to the Taliban’s claims of
victory. They had seen the Taliban
driven away by the coalition forces
and knew they would be back by
nightfall.
Continued sweeps in Bravo
turned up very little. There was
confirmatory information from
other local nationals. By 1100 hours,
Lieutenant-Colonel Corbould
decided to extract the force and
head back to FOB Mas’um Ghar. The
extraction plan was tricky. The enemy
was alerted and no doubt would
mine and IED the existing west-east
routes between Bravo and Route
Summit if they could. The enemy
could not be sure, however, that the
Operation Timus Preem force might
not continue to move south or west,
and they did not have an unlimited
number of devices. LieutenantColonel Corbould decided to take the
most direct option. The two breach
teams would plough two parallel
routes along the single west-east
road, and have the forces in Objective
Echo clear the junction of that road
and Summit and from Summit to
FOB Mas’um Ghar so there were no
surprises on the way home. Alertness
was a priority. It was a long and hot
operation, and thoughts of a shower
and hot food could not be allowed to
override vigilance.
Breach Team 1 headed south,
while a Badger from Breach Team
2 ploughed a track and a “parking
lot” pointing west while the forces
assembled in lanes pointing west.
ISTAR reports indicated there was
enemy observation and they were
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trying to figure out where to set up
an ambush. Once Breach Team 1 was
well on its way, Breach Team 2 peeled
back and headed south too.
By 1350 hours, the lead Badger
AEV in Breach Team 1 started to
overheat as it tried to traverse a
muddied wadi system and mechanics
were brought up to repair it. Another
Badger was pushed forward to
maintain the momentum. A Scan
Eagle MUAV flew ahead along the
planned routes to check the tree
lines for possible enemy ambushes.
Nothing so far.
At 1407 hours a Leopard 2 crew
spotted several insurgents in tall
grass south of the breaches. There
was some debate as to who was going
to engage, artillery, Predator, or the
tanks. The enemy dispersed and
withdrew as the tanks readied their
coaxial machine guns. Then Major
Adams spotted three more insurgents
manoeuvring to the south-and let fly
with a 120 mm canister round, killing
all three. The orbiting Predator reacquired the first group, which was
in the process of splitting into two
teams. It was not clear whether they
were running away or manoeuvring.
Breach Team 2, however, hit a
wet wadi system and then ploughed
into a wet cornfield. The Badgers and
Leopards had to back up and find a
route around this impasse. Could the
vehicles now start using the road to
speed things up? There was only 200
metres of it left before it hit the paved
Route Summit. The answer was no:
continue to avoid the road in case of
IEDs. Major Adams, quoting the film
“Back to the Future,” said over the
radio: “Roads? Where we’re going
we don’t NEED roads!” It was just as
well. When Breach Team 2 was forced
closer to the road because of wet
terrain, a sweep discovered an IED; it
was blown in place by the engineers.
The breach team swung north again
into navigable terrain and continued
east.
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By this time, Canadian and
Afghan forces cleared and secured
the junction as the Badgers and
Leopards bashed through the rich
earth of the fields. As soon as the
vehicles hit the junction, they headed
south to FOB Mas’um Ghar. There
were no incidents in the extraction.
Operation Timus Preem was over,
with no Canadian casualties.

beforehand, that the populations
in some of the objective areas were
either pro-government or potentially
pro-government and it is a tragedy
for the Afghans and their Canadian
allies that adequate forces were not
available to expand the security
“bubble” west from Stability Box
Juno.

Conclusions

Notes

O

peration Timus Preem had a
number of effects on the enemy
in Zharey district. First, it forced
them to re-organize their command
structure and replace leaders. Second,
it wiped out their “forward” IED
production capacity and transit base
to the Sangeray area. The cumulative
effects contributed to the lack of IED
activity directed at the Operation Aspe-Janoubi turbine transit operation
that took place days afterwards.9 The
operation also most likely took out
some of the people involved in killing
the three Canadian engineers on the
eve of the operation. The operation
also bought time for Stability Box
Juno to consolidate. There may have
been longer term effects but they
were not measureable in August
2008. By spring 2009, Construction
Management Team-2 was working
with local Afghans to address volatile
water diversion and irrigation issues
in the “box” – without noticeable or
significant enemy interference.
Operation Timus Preem,
however, continued to highlight the
problem of not being able to install
an enduring Afghan government
security and governance presence
in an area subjected to a clearance
operation. The enemy forces were
swept from the area, many were
killed and wounded, but without
adequate security in place they
returned the night after the Mechs left
for home. It was noted by all involved
in the operation, and understood
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The Canadian Leopard 2s serving in
Afghanistan now have the capability to
mount such implements.
Sean M. Maloney, “Incursion at Howz-e
Madad: An Afghanistan Vignette,”
Canadian Military History 17 no. 1 (Winter
2008), pp.
FIBUA: Fighting in Built Up Areas.
Facetiously called FART or Fighting
Around Town or FISH, Fighting in
Somebody’s House by UK forces.
Sean M. Maoney, “Panjwayi Alamo:
The Defence of Strongpoint Mushan,”
Canadian Military History 18 no. 3
(Summer 2009), pp.
The author observed the planning
process for Operation Timus Preem and
accompanied the battlegroup for the
duration of the operation in the field.
aka ‘Jabba the Hut.’
As in, “The Rocket Man.”
These were Sergeant Shawn Eades,
Corporal Dustin Wasden, and Sapper
Stephan Stock, all from 1 Combat
Engineer Regiment.
The enemy’s ”rear” or depth IED
production facilities were taken out the
night after Op Timus Preem by special
operations forces. I was told that it was
the most successful SOF strike against
Zharey IED cells in two years. This also
contributed to the success of Op ASP-EJANOUBI.

Dr. Sean M. Maloney is the historical
advisor to the Chief of the Land Staff.
He has travelled annually to Afghanistan
since 2003 to observe coalition operations.
He is the author of several books
including Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue
Historian in Afghanistan (Potomac Books,
2005) and Confronting the Chaos: A Rogue
Historian Returns to Afghanistan (Naval
Institute Press, 2009). The third book
in the series, Fighting for Afghanistan: A
Rogue Historian at War will come out early
next year from Naval Institute Press.
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